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The court decisions summarized below emphasize that reasonable suspicion of a crime must be based on specific, articulable facts, not mere hunches. Over time, the Supreme Court has expanded law enforcement's discretionary power by allowing stops based on anonymous tips if corroborated to be considered reasonable suspicion, considering the totality of circumstances. A trend in these rulings is the Court's gradual movement towards giving police greater leeway in stops, especially when they can articulate a reasonable basis for suspicion that combines individual behaviors, patterns, or contexts suggestive of criminal activity.

Reasonable Suspicion

LANDMARK CASES

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada (2004): The Supreme Court ruled that states can require individuals to disclose their identity to a law enforcement officer when stopped on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as it does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures or the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination.

United States v. Arvizu (2002): The Supreme Court emphasized that officers can consider the totality of the circumstances when determining reasonable suspicion for a stop and that individual factors can be considered collectively.

 

Illinois v. Wardlow (2000): The Court held that unprovoked flight upon seeing the police, in an area known for high narcotics activity, creates reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop.

Florida v. J.L. (2000): The Court ruled that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability does not justify a stop and frisk by police officers. The decision emphasized that such tips must be corroborated by police observation or other aspects to meet the reasonable suspicion standard required for Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

 

Florida v. Bostick (1991): The Court held that police can approach and question individuals on buses without a warrant or probable cause, as long as the encounter is consensual.

 

Alabama v. White (1990): The Court held that an anonymous tip, when combined with police corroboration of predictive information, can create reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.

 

United States v. Sokolow (1989): The Supreme Court held that the DEA agents had reasonable suspicion to detain Sokolow based on his behavior and travel patterns, even though each individual factor might be innocent.

 

United States v. Hensley (1985): The Supreme Court ruled that a Terry stop could be justified based on a wanted flyer, as long as there is reasonable suspicion to make the stop.

 

United States v. Cortez (1981): The Court clarified that reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances and requires specific and articulable facts, not a hunch or an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.

 

United States v. Mendenhall (1980): The Court emphasized that a person is seized only if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed they were not free to leave.

 

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976): While dealing with a different context (immigration checkpoints), the Court recognized that stops and brief questioning can be conducted without a warrant based on reasonable suspicion.

 

Terry v. Ohio (1968): This landmark case established the "stop and frisk" doctrine, allowing police officers to stop and briefly detain individuals if they have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the person may be armed and dangerous.

REASONABLE SUSPICION FAQs

Q: What is reasonable suspicion in the context of First Amendment auditing?

A: Reasonable suspicion refers to a legal standard where a law enforcement officer has a factual and logical basis to suspect someone may be involved in criminal activity.

 

Q: How does reasonable suspicion differ from probable cause?

A: Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, requiring less evidence. Probable cause is needed to make arrests or conduct searches, while reasonable suspicion is enough for brief stops or detentions.

 

Q: Can an auditor be stopped based on reasonable suspicion?

A: Yes, if a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion that an auditor is involved in criminal activity, they can legally stop and briefly detain the auditor.

 

Q: What rights do First Amendment auditors have during a stop based on reasonable suspicion?

A: Auditors have the right to remain silent, the right to refuse consent to a search, and the right to record the interaction unless it interferes with police operations.

 

Q: Can filming in public create reasonable suspicion?

A: Merely filming in public is generally not enough to create reasonable suspicion, but additional factors or behaviors might contribute to it.

 

Q: Is an auditor required to identify themselves if stopped under reasonable suspicion?

A: Some states, but not all, have “stop and identify” statutes requiring individuals to identify themselves during a police stop. In Hiibel vs. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada (2004), the Supreme Court ruled that states may pass laws requiring individuals to disclose their identity to a law enforcement officer when there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity. In some states, failure to identify can be a standalone charge. In other states, the individual can only be charged with failure to identify if they are being detained for another suspected crime.

 

Q: How long can an auditor be detained under reasonable suspicion?

A: Detention should be no longer than necessary to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion, typically a brief duration.

 

Q: Can reasonable suspicion justify the seizure of recording equipment?

A: Generally, equipment cannot be seized without probable cause, but in certain circumstances, if the equipment is believed to contain evidence of a crime, it might be temporarily seized.

 

Q: What should an auditor do if they feel they're unjustly stopped?

A: Remain calm, comply with lawful orders, and clearly state your belief that the stop is unjust. Auditors should document the encounter and consult with an attorney afterward.

 

Q: Can reasonable suspicion be based on the content of an auditor's speech?

A: No, reasonable suspicion cannot be solely based on the content of protected speech. It must be based on behavior or circumstances indicative of criminal activity.

 

Q: Can reasonable suspicion be based on an anonymous tip?

A: Yes, if an anonymous tip has enough detail that shows a basis of knowledge or predictive information that police can verify, it may contribute to reasonable suspicion. However, an anonymous tip alone that does not show signs of reliability or contain adequate detail does not constitute reasonable suspicion.

 

Q: What constitutes insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion in an audit?

A: Insufficient basis might include vague or unspecified suspicions, reliance on protected First Amendment activities, or racial profiling.

 

Q: Can an auditor challenge the legality of a stop based on reasonable suspicion?

A: Yes, an auditor can challenge the stop's legality later through legal proceedings, particularly if they believe it was based on unconstitutional grounds.

 

Q: How does reasonable suspicion affect an auditor's right to remain silent?

A: An auditor always has the right to remain silent, but in some states, they may be legally required to identify themselves to law enforcement.

 

Q: Can reasonable suspicion lead to a full search of an auditor?

A: A full search usually requires probable cause, although a pat-down for weapons might be permitted if the officer has a reason to believe the auditor is armed and dangerous.

 

Disclaimer: The information provided in these FAQs is for general informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult a licensed attorney.

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